profile(kvc): rewrite v5+profile report after critic audit + P0/P1 instrument
Hostile audit of the original report flagged three load-bearing errors:
1. held_tokens semantic was inverted. session_held_tokens() at
session_aware_cache.py:278-282 sums (kv_allocated_len - cache_protected_len)
per slot, i.e. slot-private (NOT in radix tree). So "other = cap - held -
avail" actually CONTAINS the radix-tree protected prefix cache (likely the
single biggest component for shared agentic prefixes), not just running
batch + in-flight as the original report claimed.
2. Admission-race causal hypothesis for the 415 EXP2+profile errors is
contradicted by the data: 414/415 errors have kv_transfer_blocks > 0 — they
passed admission and died downstream ("generate stream ended before
producing any token", raised by the client when a 200 response had an empty
stream).
3. Polling deconfound was too quickly dismissed. Mode counts shift ~1:1
(session-cap-fb -356 / kvcache-centric +406), and /server_info is not a
passive read — it dispatches into the scheduler main loop and iterates
every session slot.
Plus: per-D error% confounded by sticky session affinity (only 18 unique
sessions cause 415 errors, decode-3 had 0 errors only because no high-error
session landed there); decile 10 "recovery" was an equal-time binning
artifact (24.5% under equal-count); v5 vs v5+profile time gap was 21h not
6h; p50/p90 latency comparison is N=1.
Rewritten report (docs/V5_PROFILE_INVESTIGATION_ZH.md) marks each correction
with ⚠️ and demotes admission-race to one of four hypotheses (H1-H4).
Action items split into P0 (verify, must do first) and P1 (instrument):
P0 — scripts/sweep_tp1_v5_baseline_rerun_exp2.sh runs 3x v5 baseline EXP2
(no polling, identical config to the original v5 run) to test whether the
9-error baseline result is reproducible. If 3 runs give ~9 errors and
profile gives 415, polling is the leading suspect. Currently running
in background.
P1 — scheduler.py:_compute_pool_breakdown_for_diagnostics adds a read-only
"pool_breakdown" dict to /server_info covering: radix_evictable_tokens,
radix_protected_tokens, slot_private_held_tokens, session_slot_count,
running_batch_{reqs,kv_tokens}, transfer_queue_{reqs,tokens},
prealloc_queue_{reqs,tokens}, retracted_queue_{reqs,tokens}. With these,
"unaccounted = cap - sum(known)" exposes true leakage. replay.py captures
all fields into the per-tick row; analyzer prints the decomposition and
gracefully handles old timeseries (prints "P1 instrument absent").
Mock-tested end-to-end. SGLang patch is read-only and does not affect
admission/scheduling. Old v5+profile data still analyzes correctly.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -171,9 +171,80 @@ def analyze(timeseries_path: Path) -> dict[str, Any]:
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print(
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"\nLegend: active=held-idle idle=idle_evictable "
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"other=cap-held-avail (prefill backup, in-flight, fragmentation)"
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"other=cap-held-avail (radix-protected + running-batch + in-flight + frag)"
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)
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# P1: decomposition of "other" using pool_breakdown fields (zeros if instrument absent)
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has_breakdown = any(
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any(r.get(k) for k in (
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"radix_evictable_tokens",
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"radix_protected_tokens",
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"running_batch_kv_tokens",
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"transfer_queue_tokens",
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"prealloc_queue_tokens",
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"retracted_queue_tokens",
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))
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for r in rows
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)
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if has_breakdown:
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print("\n=== P1 'other' decomposition (per worker, mean over run) ===")
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print(
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f"{'worker':<12} {'role':<8} | "
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f"{'r_evictable':>11} {'r_protected':>11} {'slot_private':>12} | "
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f"{'run_batch':>10} {'transfer':>9} {'prealloc':>9} {'retracted':>10} | "
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f"{'unaccounted':>11}"
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)
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for wid in sorted(by_worker.keys()):
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ws = by_worker[wid]
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role = ws[0].get("worker_role", "?")
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cap = max(int(r.get("capacity_tokens") or 0) for r in ws)
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def m(field: str) -> float:
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vals = [int(r.get(field) or 0) for r in ws]
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return statistics.fmean(vals) if vals else 0.0
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r_ev = m("radix_evictable_tokens")
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r_pr = m("radix_protected_tokens")
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slot = m("slot_private_held_tokens")
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rb = m("running_batch_kv_tokens")
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tq = m("transfer_queue_tokens")
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pq = m("prealloc_queue_tokens")
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rq = m("retracted_queue_tokens")
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avail = m("available_tokens")
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# `running_batch_kv_tokens` overlaps with radix_protected for tree-tracked
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# reqs — do NOT subtract it again. Decomposition assumes:
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# capacity ≈ avail + r_evictable + r_protected + slot_private
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# + transfer_queue + prealloc_queue + retracted_queue + unaccounted
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unacc = max(
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0,
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cap - avail - r_ev - r_pr - slot - tq - pq - rq,
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)
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print(
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f"{wid:<12} {role:<8} | "
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f"{_fmt_tokens(r_ev):>11} {_fmt_tokens(r_pr):>11} {_fmt_tokens(slot):>12} | "
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f"{_fmt_tokens(rb):>10} {_fmt_tokens(tq):>9} {_fmt_tokens(pq):>9} {_fmt_tokens(rq):>10} | "
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f"{_fmt_tokens(unacc):>11}"
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)
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summary["workers"][wid]["pool_breakdown_avg"] = {
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"radix_evictable": r_ev,
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"radix_protected": r_pr,
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"slot_private_held": slot,
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"running_batch_kv": rb,
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"transfer_queue": tq,
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"prealloc_queue": pq,
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"retracted_queue": rq,
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"available": avail,
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"unaccounted": unacc,
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}
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print(
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"\nNote: running_batch_kv_tokens overlaps with radix_protected_tokens "
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"(tree-tracked decode reqs are also in protected); not summed."
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)
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else:
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print("\n(P1 instrument absent: pool_breakdown fields are all zero)")
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# Session residency churn: how many distinct sessions ever sat on each worker,
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# and how many sessions hopped across workers (= starvation indicator).
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print("\n=== Session residency churn ===")
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